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The safety of repurchase agreements (repos) depends on the neoclassical premise 
that markets are reliable sources of liquidity; repos in practice disprove the theory 
by generating collateral calls, collateral sales, liquidity events, and liquidity-driven 
losses for repo-borrowing funds and their end investors. As repo-type lending now 
dominates money markets, borrowers’ self-protective preference for ‘safe assets’ 
as collateral has distorted financial markets, disrupting private investment, and 
economic performance. Using a balance sheet approach this paper explains the 
liquidity-supporting role of the traditional banking system and contrasts it with the 
liquidity-demanding repo-based financial system. The paper also argues that 
contractual structure determines the balance of power in private sector loans, that 
no private loan is ‘safe’ for both borrower and lender, and that repo has shifted the 
balance of safety decisively in favour of lenders. 
Keywords: repurchase agreements, safe assets, market liquidity, banking, liquidity 
crises, secular stagnation 
Introduction 
The fundamental problem of finance is this: even though debt plays an important role in 
production and growth, what constitutes ‘safe’ debt for a lender is precisely the opposite 
of what constitutes ‘safe’ debt for a borrower. Because the future is uncertain, safe 
borrowing requires debt that is long-term and unsecured. Lending by contrast is safe when 
debt is extremely short-term and grants the lender the immediate right to seize the 
borrower’s assets as soon as there is any risk of default. The banking system offers a 
modicum of safety to both lenders and borrowers, not just by transforming the maturity 
of the debt, but more importantly by placing the burden of loss due to default on the bank 
owners, whose interests thus lie in making the system of maturity transformation work. 




the relationship between borrowers and lenders and has culminated in the growth of 
repurchase agreements (repos): Repos are a type of collateralized loan that gives lenders 
particularly strong contractual rights over borrower assets (Riles, 2011).  This paper 
studies the consequences of this shift to a repo-based financial system and asks whether 
the traditional deposit-funded banking system provides better support for financial 
stability and performance than the ‘market-based’ system that has developed over the past 
few decades. 
While the instability associated with repo markets is well established in the 
International Political Economy literature (Gabor, 2016; Gabor & Ban, 2016), this paper 
identifies contractual structure as both the foundation of the ‘safety’ that repo creates for 
the lender – at the expense of the repo borrower – and the source of instability. Drawing 
on earlier work explaining the role played by the traditional banking system in stabilizing 
and providing liquidity to the economy (Sissoko, 2016a; Sissoko, 2016b),1 a balance sheet 
approach compares the traditional banking system to the modern ‘market-based’ financial 
system. I find that this transformation both fosters instability and also explains the excess 
demand for safe assets that is associated with lacklustre economic performance and 
secular stagnation. 
Collateralized loans take many different forms – a mortgage loan is not the same 
as a repo. The problem studied in this paper is not the growth of collateralized lending 
per se, but the growth of repo-type collateralized loans.2 In this paper the term ‘repo 
market’ will be used somewhat loosely to aggregate both repo and margin transactions. 
The latter have the same basic contractual structure as repo, but in a margin transaction 





In a repo contractual structure creates safety for the lender: a threshold level of 
over-collateralization is set, and if it is not maintained the lender has the right to sell the 
collateral. Thus, given a $1 million loan with a 110 per cent collateral threshold, a 
collateral call is issued when the collateral value falls below $1.1 million. The call must 
be met within days or the collateral will be sold to pay off the loan with sales proceeds in 
excess of the $1 million loan returned to the borrower. In short, due to contractual 
structure as long as over-collateralization is properly managed a repo is a genuinely safe 
asset independent of the riskiness of the collateral financed. On the other hand, if the 
market for collateral is illiquid and over-collateralization is insufficient, then a decline in 
price between the call and the sale of the collateral may mean that the lender does not 
recover the value of the loan. Market liquidity in turn depends on the absence of a 
coordinating device that will cause an imbalance between buyers and sellers on the 
market. At the same time, widespread use of repos creates just such a coordinating device: 
a decline in the price of collateral generates collateral calls and, when the calls are not 
met, collateral sales, and further declines in price. Furthermore, if future market illiquidity 
is anticipated, then a careful repo lender will demand more collateral against the loan by 
raising the over-collateralization threshold, increasing the likelihood that the call is not 
met, that collateral is sold, and that prices fall further.3  
In the 1930s brokers’ loans, comparable to repos, were widely viewed as having 
played an important role in the US stock market crash of 1929 (Smiley & Keehn, 1988), 
and US banks were struggling to perform their role as liquidity providers. Unsurprisingly, 
Keynes (1997 [1935]) explicitly discusses the instability of US markets, when he explains 
the ephemeral nature of market liquidity, observing ‘there is no such thing as liquidity of 
investment for the community as a whole’. Building upon his insights I develop an asset 




latter characterizes any capitalist economy and instability builds up over time throughout 
the economy, my instability hypothesis is specific to a financial system that relies heavily 
on repo-type contracts. Instability can be triggered by the failure of a single financial 
market participant with a large balance sheet. Minsky’s theory is, however, entirely 
consistent with this paper: because banking successfully stabilized financial markets – 
and their liquidity – the financial system evolved to rely so heavily on market liquidity 
that it is now ‘designed’ to cause liquidity to fail.4  
Because repo markets are premised on the neoclassical model where markets 
themselves are a source of liquidity, repo markets have the effect of exposing a 
deconstruction of neoclassical economic theory. By treating neoclassical theory as a text 
and its approach to liquidity as a key concept that is constructed on a contradiction,5 we 
see that repos expose ‘liquidity’ as one of the fault lines of the neoclassical model.6  In 
short, the effect of taking the neoclassical model seriously by turning to repo for liquidity 
is to expose the flaws inherent in this conception of liquidity – or in other words to cause 
real world market liquidity to evaporate. The effect of repo markets on liquidity is well 
established in the literature: for Gabor (2016) this effect creates an ‘impossible repo 
trinity’, and Gabor and Vestergaard (2018) draw lessons from it for European repo market 
regulation. Bryan and Rafferty (2013) study this phenomenon, finding that the tools of 
modern finance are premised on liquid markets that since 2008 have failed. Saguato 
(2015), too, describes it and calls for repo market reform. Pitluck (2011) analyses a related 
phenomenon, establishing that illiquidity is a pervasive problem in US markets by 
studying the behaviour of asset managers.  
Social Studies of Finance scholars view markets as ‘neither essences nor pure 
constructions but as contingent outcomes of the way in which they are performed’ 




private debt obligations into ‘safe’ assets by relying on markets for collateral, but founder 
on the problematic ‘reality’ of the neoclassical construction of markets. The shift to repo 
by simultaneously putting neoclassical theory into effect and changing the way the object 
of the theory, the ‘market’, is performed, in practice has the effect of subverting the 
theory. Before 2008 the neoclassical theory of market liquidity was often viewed by 
financial economists as a simple, but not unreasonable, description of financial markets 
most of the time. Subsequent to the crisis that demonstrated the instability of repo-based 
financial markets, governments, not markets, have begun to be viewed as the fundamental 
source of liquidity, displacing the neoclassical view. That is, the repo-driven 2008 
liquidity crisis is an example of counterperformativity because repo ultimately 
undermined support for the neoclassical approach to market liquidity (cf. MacKenzie, 
2006).  
In the first section a schematic for comparing repo-based modern markets to the 
traditional banking system is presented. The schematic uses the techniques of balance 
sheet analysis developed by Minsky’s followers (Bell, 2001; Mehrling, 2011; Wray, 
1990) to show how the banking system – that is, the banks with the support of the central 
bank – supports the economy through temporary periods of illiquidity by allowing the 
illiquid assets to lie hidden on the balance sheets of the banks until the liquidity event is 
over. Thus, in contrast to neoclassical theory where markets robustly provide liquidity, 
here the banking system supports liquidity when market liquidity fails. This argument 
builds on previous work which finds that during the 19th and early 20th century, markets 
in Britain were stabilized by a carefully calibrated banking system (Sissoko, 2016a) and 
argues that the neoclassical economic model, by abstracting from money and banking, 
effectively assumes this stabilizing role (Sissoko, 2007). When this balance sheet 




disrupting liquidity events show up on balance sheets. Pozsar (2014, 2015)’s analysis of 
repos and the leveraging of bond portfolios provides an important foundation for this 
discussion, and his papers are referenced throughout. The balance sheet approach 
embraces the view that the essence of money is debt (Ingham, 2006; Wray, 1990), but 
diverges from these authors by emphasizing the importance of private sector institutional 
structures to financial stability and by deemphasizing – without denying the existence of 
– sovereign backing that also plays a stabilizing role. Using this approach clarifies why 
the shift to a repo-based financial system has been destabilizing. 
The second section focuses on the consequences of the growth of repo and margin 
contracts: in the contemporary system a segment of the market necessarily realizes losses 
during a liquidity event. In an effort to avoid incurring such losses all participants prefer 
even in normal times to use as collateral ‘safe haven’ assets that will tend to hold their 
value in a liquidity crisis. The result is a segmentation of the asset market with ‘safe 
assets’ trading differently from other assets. The term ‘safe asset’ refers to an asset that 
is preferred as repo collateral (Boy, 2014; Gorton et al., 2012), and not to an asset with 
almost no price risk: Treasury bonds – which change value dramatically when interest 
rates change – are considered ‘safe assets’ (Boy, this volume). This paper posits that the 
preference for ‘safe assets’ derives from the fact that they are unlikely to fall in value 
during a liquidity crisis, and thus explains why the excess demand for safe assets that 
some treat as an exogenous characteristic of the modern economy (e.g. Caballero & Farhi, 
2013) has arisen. 
The relationship between the structural illiquidity of the modern market-based 
financial system and ‘secular stagnation’ is explored in the third section. Implications for 




From bank-based markets to a modern markets system 
Since the 1980s financial systems around the world have been transformed as the growth 
of market-based lending has displaced bank lending (Cetorelli et al., 2012; Gabor & Ban, 
2016; Hardie et al., 2013; Mehrling, 2011). The US financial system is the focus of this 
paper, and an extensive literature classifies the US system even in the early and middle 
years of the twentieth century as a ‘market-based’ financial system by comparison with 
German-type financial systems (see e.g., Allen & Gale, 1999; Levine, 2002). To 
acknowledge this established nomenclature while at the same time recognizing that in the 
United States the term ‘market-based’ finance refers to the more recent phenomenon of 
bank disintermediation, I will use the terms ‘bank-based markets’ and ‘modern markets’ 
to describe the pre-1980s US financial system and the modern US financial system 
respectively. Note, however, that ‘modern markets’ are very dependent on the central 
bank, and arguably dependent on one or more of the larger banks to make markets work.7 
I analyse this transformation using a balance sheet approach that allows me to 
keep track of what is happening to both assets and liabilities. Using balance sheets, it 
becomes clear that market-based lending’s displacement of bank lending on the asset-
side of bank balance sheets was accompanied by a reduction in deposits on the liability-
side. The growth of money funds as a substitute for deposits was instrumental in this 
process. The structure of this transformation is explained in two diagrams below. Figure 
1 depicts the role of banks in the bank-based markets system, where banks make loans 
and hold them to term on their balance sheets. The ‘entities’ are the key categories of 
participants in the system, each of which has its own balance sheet. Implicit in the concept 
of ‘having a balance sheet’ is the fact that each entity has an equity stake at risk and may 
also carry some debt. From this perspective anyone whose only asset is a deposit and who 




are the key categories of financial assets that the banks use in order to play the role that 
they do in the economy. These assets are liabilities for the entity to the left of the 
instrument and assets for the entity to the right of the instrument. The ‘services’ refer to 
the key services that are associated with the instrument in question and that the banking 
system provides. 
 
Figure 1 HERE 
 
The economics literature frames banks as intermediaries and focuses on the role 
played by banks in lending: banks perform risk analysis, act as delegated monitors, and 
transform the maturity of debt. This ‘banks as intermediaries’ approach abstracts from 
the role played by the bank balance sheet in protecting depositors from losses. Banks after 
all don’t just intermediate. Depositors can only lose money if a bank fails. So, banks – 
and the equity and subordinated debt that comprise the lower tiers of a bank’s capital 
structure – literally stand between depositors and the danger of losses on loans. In 
addition, because the central bank stands ready to provide liquidity to support banks 
through a systemic event, it also alleviates the danger that price fluctuations due to fire 
sales will impose losses on depositors (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Minsky, 2008 [1986]). 
In this way, the banking system – that is, the banks together with the central bank – 
provides protection from liquidity crises to depositors.8 Thus, in the bank-based markets 
model, the role of the banking system is to bear risk for the real economy: bank owners 
bear the credit risk of bank loans, and the banking system bears liquidity risk by making 
it possible for temporary declines in asset values to lie hidden on the balance sheets of 




system functions as a mechanism that prevents liquidity strains from being transmitted 
directly to the real economy.  
Because of the essential liquidity-supporting role played by banks in the economy, 
they have for centuries been subject to industry-specific regulation. For example, in the 
ninetieth century when banks were first granted the privilege of corporate status 
protecting bank owners from unlimited liability on the bank’s debts, bank-specific capital 
rules were also adopted. These rules were clearly designed to ensure that in the event of 
a bank failure, bank owners and not bank creditors would bear the losses – and they were 
largely successful (Macey & Miller, 1992; Turner, 2014). In the twenty-first century 
government-provided deposit insurance covers US depositors up to $250,000, and this 
policy is accompanied by careful regulation and supervision of bank assets and capital. 
US-style regulation of depository institutions is apparently sufficient to prevent runs on 
deposits, given that through the 2007-2008 crisis the United States did not experience this 
type of run. 
This balance sheet approach emphasizes the loss protection and liquidity services 
provided by banks, establishing an alternative model to that of banks primarily engaged 
in maturity transformation. These two approaches should be treated as complements: both 
models are needed if we are to understand the role that banks play in the economy. I 
acknowledge, however, that the literature on maturity transformation and on bank runs 
indicates that banks are an imperfect solution to the problem of market liquidity (Allen & 
Gale, 1999; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). Even so, the question this paper poses remains: 
Is financial stability more readily achieved by supporting a traditional deposit-funded 
banking system with deposit insurance, supervision, and access to a central bank or by 
disintermediating banks and relying more heavily on markets? The fact that banks are 




This traditional bank-based system contrasts with the modern markets system, 
where money flows in not from depositors, but from investment funds, and a crucial 
source of this inflow comes from funds that focus on cash-like assets, or ‘cash pools’.9 
Because investors in cash pools expect to be able to liquidate their holdings without loss 
instantly, cash pools serve as deposit alternatives and to do so must expose themselves to 
minimal risk of default. For this reason, they invest only in the safest of short term secured 
and unsecured assets.10 
This paper focuses on the economic role of the cash pools’ investments in secured 
assets, or repos, which comprise a substantial fraction of their total assets.11 In a repo, a 
contract to sell a marketable asset is entered into simultaneous with a contract to 
repurchase the asset at a specified price and time, making it the economic equivalent of a 
secured loan. The safety of the repo derives from the marketability of the collateral and 
the terms of the standard repo contract: a repo is over-collateralized – or, in other words, 
there is a ‘haircut’ on the amount of money that can be borrowed against each dollar of 
collateral – and the collateral position must be maintained over time. Thus, if there is a 
haircut of 5 per cent on $1 million of collateral posted, only $0.95 million can be 
borrowed. As long as the $0.95 million loan is outstanding the collateral will be valued 
on a daily basis and a collateral call will be issued on the day that the value of the collateral 
falls below $1 million.12 If the borrower does not meet the collateral call within a day or 
two, the lender has the right to sell the collateral and use the proceeds to settle the loan. 
Because any remaining proceeds after the loan has been paid off are returned to the 
borrower, the lender – and seller of the collateral – has no incentive to seek out the best 
price for the collateral. In short, in a repo contract the borrower and owner of the asset 
conditionally gives up control over the asset, and this can result in a forced sale that will 




Overall, a lender will never lose money on a properly managed repo loan,13 and repos are 
genuinely safe assets independent of the riskiness of the collateral they finance. The 
particular characteristics of a repo that make it so safe are also the characteristics that 
make it an alternative to a deposit for cash investors.14 In fact, a repo is clearly safer than 
an uninsured deposit, and this explains why corporations and investment funds generally 
prefer lending on repo to leaving their money with banks in amounts that are both 
uninsured and unsecured (Pozsar, 2015). 
While cash pools now have a safer place than banks in which to hold their funds, 
this protection is contractual and therefore provided by those who are borrowing on repo. 
My analysis below indicates that repos are safe because investment funds that hold long-
term assets like bonds, such as pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds, bear the 
risk of liquidity crises. These investment funds that invest in long-term assets are 
categorized as ‘long pools’. In the modern markets system long pools replace banks as 
the economy’s risk-bearer. 
 
Figure 2 here  
Figure 2 draws connections between the traditional role of banks and the modern 
markets system by laying out how the latter uses different entities and different 
instruments to provide many, but not all, of the services furnished by the banking system. 
In the diagram we see that the repo market offers loss protection, but not a liquidity 
cushion.  The diagram distinguishes between two different repo markets, both of which 
finance marketable collateral, but do so by providing distinct types of security for the 
lender. In the tri-party repo market the collateral is held and managed on behalf of the 
lender by a third party, the clearing bank. This allows lenders that do not have the capacity 




relying on the repo borrower to hold and manage the collateral on the lender’s behalf.15 
By contrast in the bilateral repo market lenders are typically investment banks (also 
known as dealer banks) that manage the collateral posted themselves, and the borrowers 
are long pools that may also be derivatives counterparties and brokerage clients of the 
lenders. Cash pools generally do not use the tri-party repo market to lend directly to the 
long pools, first of all because they may not want to be exposed to them as counterparties 
or to the collateral they seek to post, and second because they do not have the means to 
offer the services that the long pools are seeking. Dealers prefer to lend on the bilateral 
repo market because in addition to the right to sell the collateral outright in the event of 
default, they also have the right to use the collateral while the repo is outstanding 
(Baklanova et al., 2015). Thus, in the bilateral repo market (but not in the tri-party repo 
market) the lender may ‘rehypothecate’ the collateral or post it in another transaction.16 
To summarize, cash pools make collateralized loans on the tri-party repo market 
to dealer banks, which in turn make collateralized loans on the bilateral repo market to 
long pools. The collateral in both repo markets is composed mostly of assets originally 
owned by the long pools, since approximately 80 per cent of the collateral posted by the 
dealer banks in tri-party repo market transactions is being rehypothecated and was 
previously posted to the dealer banks in the bilateral repo market by the long pools 
(Pozsar, 2015). When a dealer bank funds bilateral repo lending by borrowing in the tri-
party market using the same collateral, the dealer is said to be running a ‘matched book’.  
Long pools are the link between long-term borrowers and the repo market. Long 
pools, including pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds, invest in securities that 
finance governments, corporations, and through securitizations a variety of other loans 
such as mortgages. Long pools often choose to increase their funds available for 




on the bilateral repo market. Long pools may also post some of these long-term assets to 
meet the margin requirements of their derivatives and short positions.17 
For the most part, however, long pools are financed by equity and their borrowing 
is limited. The Investment Company Act of 1940 limits the capacity of ‘regulated 
investment companies’ – a category that includes mutual funds, but not hedge funds – to 
borrow. In addition, past experience, such as Long-Term Capital Management’s failure 
in 1998, has alerted both hedge funds and dealer banks to the dangers of excessive 
collateralized debt, so in recent years the median hedge fund has been leveraged only two 
to one (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2018).18 Even though many long pools 
borrow little or not at all, those long pools that do borrow are likely to choose repo and 
margin liabilities over longer-term forms of debt for two reasons: First, current 
interpretations of the law allow regulated investment companies to take on leverage via 
derivatives and repo exposures (IMF, 2015; Pozsar, 2015). Second, the value over time 
of long-term assets is so uncertain that lenders on collateralized markets are willing to 
permit more leverage when the term of the loan is shorter (Geanakoplos, 2010). Thus, 
long pools that wish to make highly leveraged investments may find that the repo market 
is the only venue where the leverage they seek is available. Moreover, since most of the 
collateral that is posted by dealer banks in the tri-party repo market comes from bilateral 
repo transactions, cash pools that seek to lend on the tri-party repo market can only find 
borrowers because there are long pools borrowing on the bilateral repo market and 
posting margin against derivatives liabilities (Pozsar, 2015). Thus, it is unremarkable that 
a wide variety of long pools borrow on this market.  
As a result of this structure, when long pools borrow from dealer banks on the 
repo market, it is the equity investors in these funds who are providing loss protection in 




banks. When the dealer banks fund these transactions by entering into trades in the tri-
party repo market, the dealer banks provide loss protection to the cash pools and the dealer 
banks’ balance sheets are at risk. On the other hand, in a matched book trade a dealer 
bank will be able to fund any collateral call using a matching collateral call made on a 
long pool. Thus, in the case of matched book repo, the overall effect is that the equity 
investors in the long pools are providing loss protection to the cash pools that lend on the 
tri-party repo market – with the added protection for the cash pools that the dealer banks 
are also fully liable on the tri-party repo loans.  
Notably absent from Figure 2 is the liquidity cushion that the banking system 
provides to depositors. Behind market-based lending sits the neoclassical view that 
market prices represent reality, so investors in long funds should be exposed to price-
based losses. Thus, both mutual funds and exchange traded funds19 are designed to reflect 
such changes. And even funds that emphasize a long-term approach rather than 
immediate liquidity, such as pension funds and hedge funds, report their market value to 
their investors or beneficiaries on a regular basis. For this reason, when repo-based 
finance results in a theory-disrupting liquidity event, modern markets are designed to 
place the burden of losses on the repo borrowers, that is, on the long pool investors – and 
any dealer banks who do not manage the matching of their books carefully. This has 
consequences for the behaviour of borrowers, which I will turn to now. 
 
Consequences of market-based lending 
The modern markets system as it has evolved in the twenty-first century has serious 
disadvantages. Because the safety provided to lenders is created by contractual structure, 
it is offset by danger to borrowers. To deal with the danger of liquidity events, borrowers 




the risks faced by borrowers and the segmentation of markets that results. 
Repo contracts convert price declines into liquidity events 
The corollary to the displacement of deposits by repos is that, in the event of a decline in 
collateral value, repo borrowers may be forced to sell the collateral. The consequence of 
forced selling on any significant scale is a liquidity event in the asset subject to the sale. 
Keynes (1997 [1935]) explained how traders’ investment decisions drive the dynamics 
that create a liquidity event: 
the energies and skill of the professional investor are mainly occupied … not 
with making superior long-term forecasts of the probable yield of an 
investment over its whole life, but with foreseeing changes in the 
conventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general public.  … 
[This] is an inevitable result of an investment market [which revalues 
investments every day enabling the individual to revise his commitments.] … 
For it is not sensible to pay 25 for an investment of which you believe the 
prospective yield to justify a value of 30, if you also believe that the market 
will value it at 20 three months hence.  
In other words, when those who are in a position to recognize that the asset is undervalued 
also have reason to believe that forced sales are driving the price dislocation, they are 
unlikely to put in any but a deliberately undervalued bid until they have reason to believe 
that the forced selling of the asset is near completion. The accuracy of Keynes’ 
description of market behaviour is supported by modern experience: liquidity events in 
securities prices were witnessed with regularity from 2007 through 2008 (Barr, 2007; 
Dizard, 2008; Mackintosh, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). 
On the other hand, it is true that a liquidity event which drives price down 
temporarily can simply be ignored by an unleveraged investor with a long-term horizon, 




smooth the effects of liquidity crises by holding assets through them. The modern markets 
system is, however, characterized by repo-based leverage that generates an environment 
where liquidity events are accompanied by forced selling, the expectation of forced 
selling, and repo borrowers who realize losses. In short, as many have observed, repo 
contracts are inherently procyclical and can easily play a key role in transforming a simple 
price decline into a liquidity event, losses, and bankruptcies (Adrian & Shin, 2010; 
Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009). 
 
Long pools realize losses during liquidity events 
Long pools aggravate the liquidity problems created by repo markets in two ways. First, 
the subset of long pools that is leveraged is forced to realize losses during liquidity events. 
Because they face margin calls, some of them will be subject to forced sales, and a few 
may be forced to liquidate entirely. It should be noted that being a ‘small’ borrower is not 
protection against such a liquidity event, because it is certain that other investors will hold 
the same assets as the small borrower. As a result, any borrower can be caught up in a 
liquidity event triggered by another market participant or by a group of borrowers that 
follows a similar strategy.20 Such liquidity events impose losses on investors in leveraged 
funds that reflect gross underperformance relative to benchmarks and expose the asset 
managers who were relying on derivatives and the leverage they facilitate. The most 
widely publicized example from the 2008 crisis of a leveraged mutual fund is the 
Oppenheimer Core Bond Fund, which was an important component of state-sponsored 
college savings plans for a cluster of US states. The fund lost 36 per cent over the course 
of 2008 – a period over which comparable funds lost only 5 per cent (Oregon DOJ, 2009; 




Second, unlike an unleveraged individual investor, for a long pool the decision 
not to sell assets does not lie entirely within the discretion of the managers of the fund. 
The exit decisions taken by a subset of mutual fund investors can force the fund as a 
whole to recognize losses when riding out the liquidity event would be a better choice. 
This then creates a run dynamic, as the investors who exit first will generally earn better 
returns than those who exit later. The effect of this long pool property is that even if a 
long pool investor knows that market prices are falling due to a liquidity event and will 
over time rise again, it will be rational for the investor who is concerned about a run to 
make every effort to be among the first to exit (Cetorelli et al., 2016; Goldstein et al., 
2017). Although the structure of an exchange-traded fund is more complex, the exit of 
investors from such funds can also affect the prices of the underlying assets (Ben-David 
et al., 2014). Even hedge fund managers, who typically limit the ability of an investor to 
exit, find that liquidity events of significant duration expose the hedge fund to similar 
spillover effects. Overall, many of the long pools that bear the losses in the modern 
markets system are prone to rational runs that add to the problem of forced sales. 
To summarize, the modern markets system, which is founded on the neoclassical 
framework that assumes that markets are a source of liquidity, has the effect in real world 
markets of placing the burden of liquidity-based losses on end investors. Because long 
pool investors are forewarned that their principal is at risk, the neoclassical view is that 
they should bear these losses – unless there was a breach of duty by a seller or fiduciary. 
These losses include not only temporary fluctuations in wealth caused by price 
movements, but also realized losses when a theory-disrupting liquidity event forces sales 
either due to leverage or to investor exits. Thus, the absence of a liquidity cushion in the 




leveraged end investors. The banking system, by contrast, allows such losses to be 
avoided, by enabling banks to ‘hide’ temporarily illiquid assets on their balance sheets. 
Excess demand for “safe” assets 
The risk-free real interest rate has declined significantly – and fairly steadily – from the 
late 1990s to the present (Bean et al., 2015), but the interest rates paid by private sector 
borrowers have not declined in a similar fashion. Thus, over this time period the 
difference – or spread – between the interest rates paid on privately issued assets and on 
Treasuries has widened. In Figure 3 we see that since the late 1990s – or since the risk-
free real interest rate has been declining – spreads have remained well above their pre-
1998 long-run average (see also Illes & Lombardi, 2013; Kwan, 2014). Many observers 
describe the current environment as one where there is an excess demand for safe assets 
(see e.g., Caballero & Farhi, 2013; Kocherlakota, 2014). An alternate way to describe this 
phenomenon is as a segmentation of asset markets: the substitutability of riskier assets 
for safe assets has declined markedly. 
 
Figure 3 here 
This excess demand for safe assets can be explained by the structural shift towards 
repo-type collateralized lending and by the extraordinary protection provided to lenders 
by repo borrowers in the modern markets system. For example, as lenders the dealer 
banks in 2008 protected themselves through the crisis by issuing margin calls and raising 
the haircuts they imposed on repo collateral and this triggered the failure of some of the 
more leveraged hedge funds. These events accentuated a basic fact with which the more 
experienced market participants were already familiar: for the borrower the safest forms 




haircuts. Because the expected price volatility of an asset is a key determinant of the 
asset’s haircut, in the United States Treasuries are the safest bonds to use as collateral 
(Gabor & Vestergaard, 2016). 
Thus, I interpret Figure 3 as follows: prior to the crisis the marginal market 
participant was willing to post riskier private sector assets as collateral and this drove 
spreads down. On the other hand, many market participants were alert to the possibility 
of liquidity events when posting riskier forms of collateral which kept the spread above 
the former average. Post-crisis all participants realized that only a very select group of 
assets maintains its value during a liquidity event. This generated a strong preference for 
safe haven assets even in normal times as protection against the onset of a crisis. 
Subsequently the use of riskier assets as collateral has become much less common and 
for this reason spreads have risen and remain bounded away from the previous long-term 
average. Indeed, in recent years spreads are typically at a level comparable to the highs 
of previous cycles. In short, the structural shift in financial markets towards repo-type 
lending has so changed the nature of the demand for safe assets that the bond market has 
become segmented: the highest quality sovereign bonds, which make the best collateral, 
cannot be replaced by riskier debt (see also Pozsar, 2015).21 
   
Figure  4 here 
 
This view of the economic consequences of the growth of repo markets is 
supported by both theoretic modelling and the data on the use of collateral in financial 
markets. Fostel and Geanakoplos (2016) model the use of a commodity as collateral and 
find an ‘overvaluation’ effect: when demand to use an asset as collateral is added to other 




environment where it is not used as collateral. More importantly, the timing of the growth 
in the use of collateral on financial markets – and its counterpart the rise of cash pools – 
coincides very closely with the observed decline in the risk-free real interest rate. Figure 
4 shows that the use of collateral in over-the-counter derivatives contracts increased six-
fold from 1999 to 2006, and then tripled over the course of 2007 and 2008.22 Similarly, 
over the course of the 1990s the repo market grew slowly, but then tripled in size from 
the late 1990s through 2008 (Klee & Stebunovs, 2011; FSOC, 2014). Both markets shrank 
abruptly in 2008, but then stabilized, the repo market at double its size in 1999 and the 
derivatives collateral market at 15 times its 1999 size (ISDA 2015).  Pozsar (2014) 
documents that the timing of the growth of cash pools is comparable. Overall, data 
supports the view that the growth of repo-type lending has resulted in an environment 
where credit is simultaneously abundant for those that least need to borrow and relatively 
scarce for the private sector borrowers who are presumably best positioned to put the 
funds to good use. 
Secular stagnation: Growth in a structurally illiquid economy 
The secular stagnation hypothesis23 posits that the world in which economic policymakers 
act has changed: in the past monetary policy could be used to balance the goals of 
maintaining employment and restraining inflation, and supervision was presumed to be 
adequate to prevent financial instability. Now the excess of saving over investment is 
chronic, and monetary policy may be incapable of rebalancing the economy without 
destabilizing the financial system. The principal evidence of a structural problem is that 
policy rates have remained at zero for seven years, even as economic activity has been 
far from robust (Summers, 2014, 2015). Thus, the secular stagnation hypothesis builds 




largely to the savings behaviour of emerging market countries (Bernanke, 2005, 2015b). 
Quantity-wise, however, the more important shift in savings behaviour was that of the 
developed world’s corporate sector: the ‘savings glut’ is best understood as an investment 
famine (Gruber & Kamin, 2015; Loeys et al., 2005; Portes, 2007; Wolf, 2013). Figure  5 
depicts the net savings of US corporations which have been positive since 2001 – with 
the exception of 2007-2008 when many corporations were probably forced to run down 
their savings or borrow in order to get through the crisis. This change in behaviour is both 
unprecedented and ‘unnatural’, as corporations should be best positioned to find 
investment opportunities and to be ‘natural’ borrowers when they exploit these 
opportunities. Because this shift has taken place across most of the high-income countries, 
a general explanation of this corporate behaviour is needed. 
 
Figure 5 here 
Economists who advance the secular stagnation hypothesis struggle to explain 
why this structural excess of savings over investment has arisen, and in the absence of a 
clear explanation, the economists who reject the secular stagnation hypothesis are 
probably as numerous as those who accept it (Bernanke, 2015a; Eichengreen, 2014). This 
article proposes a very different explanation for the fact that risk-free interest rates 
declined for a decade and have remained at zero for more than seven years: our financial 
structure has changed. The growth of the modern markets system and the associated repo-
type collateralization of financial sector liabilities has made liquidity crises endemic. 
Market participants have responded by segmenting the market: an asset is either expected 
to have safe haven status in a crisis or it is not – and only the safe haven assets make good 




This new world where liquidity events are endemic exhibits several characteristics 
that serve to entrench the problem of illiquidity. First, liquidity events necessarily result 
in ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ – where the winners are those who hold a liquid cash position 
during the liquidity event and recognize the value of buying as the forced selling comes 
to an end. Second, in such an environment those with the most resources are better 
positioned to maintain a liquid position and therefore to purchase at fire sale prices. Thus, 
when liquidity events are endemic there is little hope that a middle class that was hit by 
significant losses in the last crisis will recover its position over time, because – at least in 
the aggregate – the middle class is almost sure to be liquidity constrained at the moment 
when there are windfall profits to be made. Overall, the shift in financial markets structure 
may be aggravating the growing inequality that has been so thoroughly documented in 
recent years (Lysandrou, 2011; Piketty, 2013). A related point is that in an economy prone 
to liquidity events, there are few prospects that the average consumer will recover the 
confidence in the future that is necessary for economic recovery. And when the prospects 
for recovery are dim, businesses have little motivation to invest, further reducing these 
prospects and increasing the likelihood that it is in a cash-rich corporation’s interest to 
hold a liquid position that will allow it to take advantage of the next liquidity event (cf. 
El Erian, 2016). In short, just as liquidity begets liquidity (Foucault et al., 2013), 
illiquidity also feeds upon itself. 
If this analysis is correct, then it is true, as secular stagnation theorists argue, that 
escape from stagnation cannot be achieved using the traditional tools of monetary policy 
– but it is equally true that fiscal policy will simply serve as an analgesic. This critique 
can also be applied to policy proposals that are specifically addressed to the problem of 
low interest rates and a ‘safe asset shortage’. An increase in the debt issuance of those 




Pozsar, 2015) may, like fiscal policy, serve to ease the distress caused by weak economic 
performance, but fails to address root causes. Similarly, implementation of very strict 
regulation of issuers – possibly combined with government insurance – to convert 
privately issued debt into safe assets (Gorton & Metrick, 2010) addresses only the 
symptoms, not the underlying problem.24  
A third policy option addresses the price instability generated by repo markets 
directly: the central bank can step in to backstop markets and forestall the consequences 
of a fire sale (Bryan & Rafferty, 2013; Gabor & Vestergaard, 2016; Mehrling, 2011).25 
Indeed, most advocates of this option argue that this would be a natural extension of the 
traditional lender of last resort role of the central bank to the modern ‘market-based’ 
financial system. While this proposal has the advantage of addressing the price instability 
that lies at the root of the economic malaise, the question that arises is why direct central 
bank intervention in markets is an improvement over the traditional system’s 
intermediated central bank support of markets. After all, the growth of ‘market-based’ 
finance has transferred less liquid assets out of banks and onto markets, the effect has 
been destabilizing, and the proposed solution is for the central bank to provide direct 
support to the value of these illiquid assets. Unsurprisingly, the capacity of the central 
bank to do a better job than the market of determining the ‘true’ price of these assets has 
been questioned (e.g., King, 2016). By contrast, the advantages of bank-based markets 
lie in their built-in protections when dealing with assets mispriced due to a liquidity event. 
First, the banks are supervised, so the central bank can enforce standards on both bank 
management and bank capital in normal times before a crisis arises. Second, the loans are 
recourse loans, so the central bank is only exposed to losses on the assets if the borrowing 
bank fails. As a result, when a loan is under-collateralized the traditional lender of last 




knowledge of the quality of that balance sheet.  Thus, proponents of direct central bank 
intervention in markets must answer the question: Why is it a better solution to this 
problem to assign what may be an impossible task to central banks rather than to simply 
require that the assets that are prone to illiquidity be migrated back onto bank balance 
sheets? Perhaps these proponents can come up with a system that addresses the inevitable 
overpricing of illiquid assets by central banks as well as old-fashioned bank-based 
markets did, but to my knowledge no such detailed proposal has been made. 
Sceptics of the banking system have for generations argued for a fourth policy 
option: the financial system would be made more stable by eliminating the role played by 
banks in lending and by adopting 100% reserve banking, that is, by requiring banks to 
hold as assets only central bank liabilities or government debt (Benes & Kumhof, 2012; 
Cochrane, 2014; Kotlikoff, 2010; Levitin, 2016; Phillips, 1996; Wolf, 2014).26 
Proponents of such reform have argued that investment funds are capable of supporting 
the same quantity and quality of debt as the banking system. The growth of the modern 
markets system gives us a window into what would likely be the actual consequences of 
such a reform. The problem with markets is that they provide liquidity in normal times, 
but this source of liquidity evaporates when prices are expected to fall. Both repo-based 
leverage and the prevalence of investment pools increase the frequency of liquidity events 
on markets. By eliminating the ability of banks to keep illiquid assets on their balance 
sheets – with central bank support – these reformers will subject the economy to the full 
force of the liquidity events that are intrinsic to markets (see King, 2016), and as in the 
modern markets system there will be great value to having a liquid portfolio in a crisis. 
By contrast, bank-based markets rely on the central bank to smooth liquidity events so 
that the value of being in possession of a liquid portfolio remains fairly stable. Overall, 




likely find that the only solution – if financial stability is our goal – is the reintermediation 
of the banking system. 
Conclusion: Implications for our understanding of safety and collateral 
The traditional role of the banking system is to provide a modicum of safety to 
both the lenders and borrowers in the economy by engaging in maturity transformation, 
by protecting depositors from losses on bad debt, and by insulating the real economy from 
liquidity events. The growth of ‘market-based’ finance has been accompanied not just by 
a shift away from bank lending and towards collateralized lending, but more importantly 
by a shift of the balance of power in debt contracts: the modern world of repo-based 
finance is built on contracts that favour lenders to the greatest degree possible. Thus, the 
unprecedented security that collateral provides to lenders in modern markets is grounded 
in the ubiquitous use of a contractual structure based on repo. The ultimate result of this 
shift has been a self-protective change in investment fund behaviour that exacerbates 
liquidity problems and undermines economic performance by reducing the financing 
available for private borrowers.  
The growth of repo markets has had these effects, because repo markets convert 
a simple decline in collateral prices into a liquidity event via the collateral calls and 
collateral sales that are integral to the operation of repo. That is, the same contractual 
structure that empowers lenders also drains liquidity from the financial system. During 
these liquidity events, repo borrowers realize losses, and in light of the dangers of repo 
borrowing, these borrowers exhibit a strong preference for the safest collateral – that 
issued by the highest quality sovereigns. This segmentation of asset markets explains the 
‘safe asset’ shortage, the comparatively high cost of corporate borrowing, and the 




This repo-driven shift in socio-economic relations to the advantage of lenders and 
the detriment of borrowers has not only displaced the economy’s traditional source of 
liquidity, the banking system, but has also disrupted neoclassical theory itself. 
Neoclassical theory views markets as inherently liquid. Repo, by putting neoclassical 
theory into effect, exposes the contradictions in the theory. The final result is 
counterperformative. Repo by taking neoclassical theory seriously, has played an 
important role in its ultimate rejection: now government is almost universally viewed as 
a far more important source of liquidity than markets.  
Indeed, many argue that sovereign-issued ‘safe assets’ are the cornerstone upon 
which the financial system is built. The purpose of a financial system is, however, to 
manage risk, not to avoid it, and I show here that repo, the safest of assets, in fact, hobbles 
the financial system. Safety for the individual is a trap for the economy.  
This conundrum of safety is constructed on the conundrum of collateral, which in 
turn is constructed on the conundrum of liquidity. As Keynes observed eighty years ago, 
there is no such thing as liquidity for the economy as a whole. I explain here that the 
traditional support for economy-wide liquidity is the banking system which exists to 
balance the various forces that make up the market by offering a small measure of safety 
to all participants. 
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Notes 
1 Indeed, I have found that the financial system has been deliberately retooled at the behest of the 
financial industry (Sissoko, 2010; Sissoko, 2017). 
2 The focus here is on the macroeconomic implications of repos’ contractual structure, so other 






and the role they may play in financing private sector investment (Gabor & Vestergaard, 
2016; Singh, 2011), are not studied here. 
3 Riles (2011) documents how market participants built the legal infrastructure supporting these 
remarkably lender-friendly collateral terms both by lobbying successfully for new statutes 
and by constructing chains of ‘legal fictions’ or ‘statement[s] that [are] consciously 
understood to be false’, but that practitioners find useful. She concludes that the growth of 
the repo market upon this foundation created a new reality as these fictions gained a 
‘practical legitimacy’ that was ‘enduring, even at times of crisis’. The use of the term ‘legal 
fiction’ – a term generally reserved for analytic tools created by courts of law – may, 
however, give the legal process that Riles describes an unwarranted veneer of respectability. 
4 This view of financial market stability helps explain Spears’ findings in this volume: derivatives 
markets were initially founded on the assumption of bank-sourced liquidity – that is, on the 
ability of dealer banks to borrow and lend at LIBOR – but after the growth of market-based 
lending had undermined the banking system, this assumption failed and the pricing of 
derivatives became almost impossibly complex. 
5 The contradiction is generated by assuming that agents take prices as given while at the same 
time using their decisions to determine prices: as a result, it is well established that 
neoclassical market equilibrium is not incentive compatible except when there are very 
many agents on both sides of every market (Geanakoplos, 1987). 
6 That economic models can be deconstructed is unsurprising, as a fundamental premise of 
economics is that “All models are wrong”. A pragmatic approach to this reality is advocated 
by, for example, Dani Rodrik (2015) who explains that economics is a collection of models 
and that the practice of economics is the art of navigating between models. 
7 JPMorgan Chase, through its bank subsidiary, together with its predecessor, Morgan Guaranty, 
has played such a significant role in the tri-party repo market since the 1990s that it raises 
doubts as to whether the bank-market dichotomy is meaningful. Consistent with earlier data, 
in 2007 17 per cent of the bank’s balance sheet funded repos, in 2013 12 per cent, and in 
March 2016 9 per cent (Call Report data, https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/) 
8 There is reason to believe that the founders of the Bank of England had as one of their goals 
stabilization of the money market, and thus that the capacity of the central bank to play this 
role was part of the design of the Bank of England when it was founded (see Sissoko, 2003, 
quoting Anderson, 1787). 
9 ‘Cash pools’ include not only money market mutual funds, but also other funds devoted to near-
cash instruments including those managed by corporate treasuries and the liquid assets of 
funds that invest in longer-term assets (Pozsar, 2015).  





11 The extension of this approach to other aspects of the modern markets system is left to future 
work. 
12 In fact, repo contracts are very short-term and at every renewal the lender may raise the haircut. 
This has the effect of making even more dramatic the problem that is explained here using 
a scenario where the haircut stays constant. 
13 The lender loses money only if the price of the collateral falls so fast that the over-
collateralization is insufficient to compensate for the price fall – which implies that the 
haircut was set too low in the first place. This is a statement about the contractual rights 
granted by this type of contract, and thus this claim regarding the ‘safety’ of repos is distinct 
from that in Spears (this volume) where he observes that derivatives counterparties assumed 
that bank counterparties could borrow at the risk-free rate and that unsecured exposures to 
them were ‘safe.’ 
14 Indeed, a repo is such a safe asset that in the years prior to the founding of the Federal Reserve, 
reserves of the US banking system were invested in repo-type loans on equities (Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors, 1943). 
15 20th century financial history is littered with cases of failed custodians, comparable to MF 
Global, a brokerage firm which was found when it went bankrupt in 2011 to have 
misappropriated customer funds. 
16 Rehypothecation does not weaken the contractual protection provided to the repo lender. The 
repo lender has the obligation to return equivalent collateral, not specific collateral, to the 
borrower. Thus, when a borrower default occurs, giving the lender the right to foreclose on 
the collateral, the lender has the right to sell equivalent collateral to close out the transaction, 
and the fact that the specific collateral posted by the borrower is no longer in the possession 
of the lender is irrelevant. 
17 While some tri-party repo data is available, data on the bilateral repo market is extremely thin, 
so repo’s precise role in the 2007-08 crisis is unclear. For example, a much-cited paper, 
Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014) (KNO), claims: ‘Our findings suggest that the run 
on repo backed by private sector collateral was not central to the collapse of short-term 
shadow bank funding in aggregate’, but KNO have data only on the tri-party repo market. 
Their data is consistent with the ‘suggested’ conclusion, but cannot address the crucial 
question: Were the dealer banks using funds raised on the tri-party repo market against 
Treasury/Agency collateral (some of which may have been posted to the dealer banks by 
conservatively managed funds) in order to lend against the collateral of private sector assets 
– to potentially less conservatively managed funds – on the bilateral repo market? While 
KNO’s data and discussion are extraordinarily valuable, the paper’s conclusions are 
overstated when cited as evidence that ‘ABCP was a larger source of short-term financing 





18 The average hedge fund has, however, much higher leverage. Thus, some large hedge funds 
rely heavily on leverage. 
19 Exchange trade funds are investment funds which issue shares that can be traded on the stock 
market. 
20 MacKenzie (2006) and Bookstaber (2008) discuss such ‘superportfolio’ effects with respect to 
the LTCM collapse in 1998. Esposito (2013) emphasizes the performativity inherent in such 
phenomena and relates them to Keynes’ description of the market as a ‘beauty contest’. 
21 That the highest quality sovereigns are favoured as collateral should not be confused with the 
claim that repo markets are only used to finance the purchase of sovereign debt. Repo market 
participants hold portfolios of sovereign debt because of their utility as collateral that can 
support short positions, derivatives positions, and raise low cost funds to invest in riskier 
assets. Furthermore, rehypothecation ensures that sovereign debt may support more than its 
own value of these activities. 
22 Collateral is posted against a derivatives contract to cover the amount owed on the contract in 
order to minimize the risk of a default when payment is due. After the 1998 financial crisis 
regulators increasingly promoted collateralization of derivatives exposures. Thus, while 
only 30 per cent of OTC derivatives trades were collateralized in 2002, by 2008 65 per cent 
and by 2013 91 per cent were collateralized (ISDA, 2009; ISDA, 2014).  
23 In economics a secular trend is long-lasting and contrasts with cyclical variations. Thus, 
‘secular stagnation’ refers to economic underperformance that is enduring and impervious 
to the forces that would normally generate a cyclical improvement. 
24 Proposals for transnational European bonds are designed to address the problems created by 
the separate character of monetary and fiscal authorities in the EU (e.g. Claessens et al., 
2012). They have advantages that lie beyond the scope of this paper. 
25 The phrase ‘market maker of last resort’, is clearly a misnomer: a market maker seeks ‘to 
discover the prices that produce balanced two-sided order flows’ and does not trade based 
on an evaluation of the fundamental value of an asset. Those who set a floor on asset prices 
are the proprietary (or value) traders. See Harris (2003). Thus, this policy proposal should 
be dubbed the ‘prop trader of last resort’. 
26 Goodhart & Perotti (2015), King (2016), and Ricks (2016) have more complicated proposals 
for reform of the banking system. 
